In a belated, correct recognition, the European Commission in March called China an economic competitor and “a systemic rival promoting alternative models of governance”. One of the most vivid illustrations of this phenomenon is the interest that a string of countries along Europe’s eastern and south-eastern flank, both EU members and not, have shown in Beijing’s invitation to join its Belt and Road Initiative.
今年3月，欧盟委员会(European Commission)将中国称为经济上的竞争对手，“一个系统性的对手，提倡不一样的治理模式”。尽管有点晚，但这总是一个正确的认识。这种竞争现象的最生动的例证之一，就是欧洲东部和东南部的一连串国家——既有欧盟成员国，也有非欧盟成员国——对中国邀请它们加入“一带一路”倡议表现出了兴趣。
The “17+1” is the informal name for China’s platform to discuss the BRI with the European end of its vast project to tie the Eurasian continent closer together. It captures the balance of influence well: 17 small European countries gathered around one giant. Brussels is right to worry that China is seeking to divide and rule, undermining a collective European policy.
“17+1合作”是中国与参与“一带一路”倡议的欧洲国家进行讨论的平台的非正式名称。它充分体现了有关各方的影响力平衡状况：17个欧洲小国聚集在一个大国的周围。布鲁塞尔方面有理由担心，中国正寻求分而治之，破坏欧洲的抱团政策。
Surprisingly, perhaps, China is not paying heavily for such influence by sending a lot of foreign direct investment to Europe. In fact European FDI in China is much bigger than the other way round, at least when it comes to greenfield investment rather than mere acquisitions of existing assets. Financially, China should be no match for the EU in its own backyard.
或许令人惊讶的是，中国并没有通过向欧洲输送大量外国直接投资(FDI)来为这种影响力付出高价。事实上，欧洲对华直接投资远远大于中国对欧洲的直接投资，至少，如果不谈收购现有资产的行为，在绿地投资方面就是如此。从经济方面看，在欧盟的后院，中国应该不是欧盟的对手。
